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The Man Behind the Curtain: Confronting Expert Testimony
Daniel W. Edwards,
"The Court does not seek to cast aspersions upon the State Police or their technicians in
making these observations but rather to underscore the fact that we must beware of putting
too much trust in the man behind the curtain. Doing so threatens to undermine one of the
fundamental trial protections defendants have enjoyed since this nation's founding.' 2

1.

INTRODUCTION

-

While Melendez-DiaZ 3 addressed the Confrontation Clause and the issue of the
introduction into evidence of testimonial certificates from experts, the Crawford4 -Davis 5
Melendez-Diaz line of cases do not address the issue of an expert's reliance on evidence that is
otherwise inadmissible in forming their opinions or inferences. Even more importantly, these
cases do not address the issue of permitting testimony at trial that involves inadmissible facts and
data essential to the basis of the expert's opinion. This article first addresses the historical
underpinnings of the Confrontation Clause and its current interpretation, and the historical and
current status of experts is explored. In defining whether evidence is "testimonial," it is suggested
that Justice Scalia's "objective witness" standard should be replaced with a "reasonable
defendant" standard. The following issues are also raised and addressed: First, when it comes to
experts, is someone - anyone - to provide testimony sufficient to satisfy the Confrontation
Clause? Justice Thomas' limiting interpretation of the Confrontation Clause is considered as a
possible solution in determining what may be testimonial and, therefore, what may be required
to satisfy confrontation rights of a criminal defendant as it relates to experts. Second, whether
business and public records are testimonial and, if testimonial, to what extent their use should be
permitted at trial. The appropriate evidentiary analysis is explored with Fed. Rule Evid. 402 being
a possible starting point in the confrontation analysis. Third, whether the balancing test in Fed.
Rule Evid. 703 or an appropriately-fashioned limiting instruction under Fed. Rule Evid. 105 is
sufficient to protect a criminal defendant's confrontation. Carefully drafted jury instructions that
clearly advise jurors of the responsibility to be fact-finders are necessary for the protection of a
criminal defendant's Confrontation Clause rights. Finally, this article seeks solutions to the
problem of introducing an expert's inadmissible facts or data as the basis for an opinion or
inference.
II.

THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

Described as an "essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is
this country's constitutional goal," 6 the right to confront witnesses in a criminal case originates in
the Sixth Amendment and was made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth

I Adjunct Professor, Sturm College of Law, University of Denver, teaching in the areas of Evidence, Criminal

Procedure, and Trial Practice. Practitioner of criminal law in Colorado as a public defender, criminal
defense attorney, and prosecutor since 1977.
2 People v. Carreira, 893 N.Y.S.2d 844, 851 (N.Y. City Ct. 2010).
3 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2530 (2009).
4 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
5 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
6 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965).
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Amendment. 7 The Sixth Amendment states, in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right.. .to be confronted with the witnesses against him...." The clause
has been interpreted as a "preference for face-to-face accusation."8 Confrontation has been
interpreted (1) to insure that statements presented to the jury are given under oath; (2) to force
the witness against the defendant to submit to cross-examination; and (3) to test the credibility
of the witness through the jurors' ability to view the demeanor of the witness as he testifies.9 The
citizens of the various States determined that the right was so important that it was included in
State constitutions, either using the language of the Sixth Amendment as a right to "confront" or
be "confronted,"1 0 or as a right to meet the witnesses against the defendant "face to face."11
7 Id. at 406.

Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980).
9 California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970).
10 See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("That in all criminal prosecutions, the accused has a right ... to be
confronted by the witnesses against him.....); ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 11 ("The accused is entitled ... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him.....); ARK. CONST. art. II, § 10 ('In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.....); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15
("The defendant in a criminal cause has the right . . to be confronted with the witnesses against the
defendant.'); CONN. CONST. art I, § 8 ('In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have a right ... to be
confronted by the witnesses against him.....); FLA. CONST. art., I § 16(a) ("In all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall . . have the right . . to confront at trial adverse witnesses....); GA. CONST. art I, § 1, para. xiv
(" Every person charged with an offense against the laws of this state . . shall be confronted with the
witnesses testifying against such person."); HAW. CONST. art. I, § 14 ('In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against the accused...."); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8 ('In
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him
or her...."); IOWA CONST. art. I, § 10 ('In all criminal prosecutions, and in cases involving the life, or liberty of
an individual the accused shall have a right . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him...."); LA.
CONST. art. I, § 16 ("An accused is entitled to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him...."); ME.
CONST. art. 1, § 6 ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have a right . . to be confronted by the
witnesses against the accused.....); MD. CONST. art. XXI ("That in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a
right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him...."); MICH. CONST. ch. 1, art. 1, § 20 ('In every
criminal prosecution, the accused shall have the right . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him or
her...."); MINN. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("The accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses
against him...."); MIss. CONST. art. Ill, § 26 ("In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have a right ... to be
confronted by the witnesses against him...."); N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 10 ('In all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall have the right . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.....); N.M. CONST. art. II, § 14
("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right . . to be confronted with the witnesses
against him...."); N.C. CONST. art. I, § 23 ('In all criminal prosecutions, every person charged with crime has
the right ... to confront the accusers and witnesses..."); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 20 ('He shall ... be confronted
with the witnesses against him.....); PA. CONST. art. I, § 9 ('In all criminal prosecutions the accused hath a
right . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him...."); R.I. CONST. art. I, § 10 ('In all criminal
prosecutions, accused persons shall enjoy the right . . to be confronted with the witnesses against
them.....); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 14 ("Any person charged with an offense shall enjoy the right ... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him.....); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10 ("He ... shall be confronted by the
witnesses against him...."); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 12 ("In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right
. . to be confronted by the witnesses against him...."); VA. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("That in criminal prosecutions a
man hath a right . . to be confronted with the accusers and witnesses..."); VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. 10 ("That in
all prosecutions for criminal offenses, a person hath a right . . to be confronted with the witnesses....').
IISee, e.g., ARIz. CONST. art. II, §24 ("In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right . . to meet the
witnesses against him face to face.....); COLO. CONST. art. II, § 16 ("In criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right ... to meet the witnesses against him face to face.....); DEL. CONST. art.1, § 7 ("In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused hath a right . . to meet the witnesses in their examination face to face.....); KAN.

CONST. Bill of Rights, § 10 ('In all prosecutions, the accused shall be allowed . . to meet the witness face to
face.... ); KY. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 11 ('In all criminal prosecutions the accused has the right . . to meet the
witnesses face to face.....); MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 12 ("And every subject shall have a right ... to meet the
witnesses against him face to face...."); Mo. CONST. art. I, § 18(a) ("That in criminal prosecutions the
accused shall have the right ... to meet the witnesses against him face to face.....); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 24
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In 1895 the United States Supreme Court addressed the right to confrontation in Mattox v.
United States. 12 Although the case itself concerned the use of testimony from a former trial of
the same action where two witnesses died before the second trial, 13 the Court held:
The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent depositions or
ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used against the
prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness, in which
the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the
conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in
order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the
manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief. 14
But even the Mattox court perceived that the "general rules of law" "must occasionally give
way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case." 15 The Court held that
exclusion of transcripts of the witnesses' testimony, even though the defendant did not have a
current opportunity to cross-examine, "would be carrying his constitutional protection to an
unwarrantable extent." 16
The Confrontation Clause has never been interpreted literally to require that any and all
information from any source be produced through the testimony of a witness available for crossexamination. Because it has never been so interpreted, the analysis of the Confrontation Clause
has always been a matter of line-drawing. Legal line-drawing must be based upon a rational
basis and have criteria that requires just results.
Thus, to come as close to the language of the Confrontation Clause and in the usual
case, the prosecution must produce the witness for cross-examination or demonstrate the
unavailability of that witness.17 Under Ohio v. Roberts, now superseded by Crawford v.
Washington1 8 , to be admissible a statement where the witness was unavailable required a
showing of "indicia of reliability." 19 Under Roberts, statements were presumed reliable if they
came within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception," 20 or there was a showing of "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness." 2 1 In Roberts, the prosecution sought to admit the preliminary
hearing transcript of a witness who did not appear at trial. 22 An out-of-court statement was
admissible and the Confrontation Clause satisfied only if the witness was unavailable and the
statement bears adequate "indicia of reliability." 23

("In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right . . to meet the witnesses against him face to
face.....); N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 15 ("Every subject shall have a right . . to meet the witnesses against him
face to face.....); OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10 ('In any trial, in any court, the party accused shall be allowed . . to
meet the witnesses face to face.....); OR. CONST. art. I, § 11 ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
have the right . . to meet the witnesses face to face...."); S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 7 ('In all criminal prosecutions
the accused shall have the right ... to meet the witnesses against him face to face...."); TENN. CONST. art. I, §
9 ("That in all criminal prosecutions, the accused hath the right . . to meet the witnesses face to face.... );
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22 ("In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right . . to meet the witnesses
against him face to face....').
12

Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).

Id. at 240.
14 Id. at 242-43.
5
i /d. at 243.
13

i6 Id.

Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980).
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
19 Roberts, 488 U.S. at 66.
20
17

18

Id.

21
22
23

Id.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 66.
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Crawford changed the Confrontation Clause analysis.24 The Court changed the second
step of the analysis from "indicia of reliability" to "prior opportunity to cross-examine" the
declarant. The analysis created by Crawford requires two things. First, the examination of any
out-of-court to determine whether the statement is testimonial. 25 A statement is testimonial if the
statement was "made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness to
reasonably believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial." 26 Second, if
the statement is determined to be testimonial, there must have been a prior opportunity for the
defendant to have cross-examined the witness. 27 Stated another way, where the issue is
testimonial evidence, the "Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required:
unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination." 28
Davis v. Washington provided an exception or clarification to the meaning of
"testimonial." 2 9 In response to the issue of whether an emergency 911 call was testimonial, the
Court held that "statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation
under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency." 30 The Court referred back to the
Crawford decision in noting the perimeters of the Confrontation Clause: (1) a witness is
someone who bears testimony, and (2) testimony is a "solemn declaration or affirmation" for the
purpose of proving a fact. 3 1 Whether a statement is testimonial is an objective inquiry. 32
However, a statement that begins objectively to be for the primary purpose of an emergency
may evolve into a statement with the primary purpose of future prosecution. 33
Professor Michael Graham has described the current state of the Confrontation Clause
by defining testimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes:
An out-of-court statement is 'testimonial' only if hearsay as defined in Fed. Rule Evid.
801 (a)-(d) and the statement was made by, or made to, or elicited by a police officer,
other law enforcement personnel, or a judicial officer under circumstances objectively
indicating at the time made that the primary purpose to which the statement will be used
by the government is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to a later
criminal prosecution. 34
The Professor describes the current interpretation of the Confrontation Clause to be
"theoretically unsound, inconsistent, confused, and illogical." 35
The United States Supreme Court first considered the interplay between expert witnesses and
the Confrontation Clause in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts. 36 With the Crawford and Davis
decisions behind them, the Court was now faced with a situation where affidavits reporting the
substance and weight of a controlled substance were introduced in evidence and not through
live testimony. 37 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, held that "there is little doubt that the
documents at issue in this case fall within the 'core class of testimonial statements'" prohibited
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
Id. at 51-52
26 Id. at 52.
27 Id. at 53-54
28 Id. at 68.
29 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
24
25

30

Id.

Id. at 823-24 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004)).
Id. at 826.
33 Id. at 828-29.
34
Michael H. Graham, Justice Scalia's Fundamentally Flowed Confrontation Clause Analysis Continues in
Melendez-Diaz: It's Time to Begin All Over Again, 45 Crim. L. Bull. 6 (2009).
31

32

35 Id.
36

Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2530-31 (2009).

37

Id.
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by the Confrontation Clause. 38 Under the objective analysis, a reasonable person would have
believed that those affidavits would be available for use at a criminal trial. 3 9 The Court held that
the statements were testimonial and that the analysts were "witnesses" for Confrontation Clause
purposes. 40 Thus to be admissible against the defendant, the prosecution would have to show
two things: that the witness was unavailable and that the defendant had been afforded a prior
opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. 41
Justice Scalia addressed six specific arguments that were made by the prosecution and/or
by the defendant.
First, the argument was made that the forensic analysts were not
"accusatory" witnesses and therefore the Confrontation Clause did not apply. 42 The Court
rejected this argument and held that there are two types of witnesses at trial and that are
addressed in the constitution: first, there are witnesses against the defendant, for which the
Confrontation Clause applies, and second, there are witnesses for the defendant, for which the
compulsory process clause applies.43
Second, the argument was made that the analysts were not "conventional," "typical," or
"ordinary" witnesses. 44 The argument goes that the conventional witness was recalling past
events while the analysts were reporting on their contemporary observations. 45 Further the
argument was made that the statements were not made in response to interrogation and
therefore the Confrontation Clause did not apply. 46 The Court rejected all of these arguments
stating that analysts were "witnesses" and that affidavits were testimonial. 47
Third, the difference between recounting historical events and memorializing neutral
scientific fact was cited as a reason why the Confrontation Clause should not apply to the
analysts. 4 8 Justice Scalia called this reasoning nothing more than a call to return to the test for
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" adopted in Roberts but later rejected in
Crawford. 49 The Court held that the Confrontation Clause "commands, not that evidence be
reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of crossexamination." 50 Confrontation is necessary because it cannot only discover the fraudulent
analyst, but also ferret out the incompetent ones.5 1
Fourth, the analysts' affidavits were neither public records or business records admissible
without confrontation. 52 While many documents may be admissible as public or business
records, ones that are created specifically for use at this trial do not fall within those
exceptions. 53 The documents are not primarily created for the use in the business or in the
agency, but rather are primarily created for use in court. 54 The test for whether the
Confrontation Clause applies to public or business records is whether they were "prepared
specifically for use at [the defendant's] trial." 5 5

38 Id.
39 Id.
40
Id.

at 2532.

41

Id.

42

Id. at 2533.
Id. at 2534.

43

44 Id.
45

Id. at 2535.

46 Id.
47 Id.
48

Id. at 2536

49 Id.
50
Id.
5

Id. at 2538.

52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
5s

/d. at 2540.
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Fifth, it was argued that the defendant at trial could have subpoenaed the analysts. This
argument was dealt short shrift when the Court indicated that it is the prosecution who has the
burden of proof and the responsibility for calling witnesses.56
Sixth, and last, the argument was made that in an age where there are analysts and experts
in almost every trial, the "necessities of trial and the adversary process," will simply cause the
criminal justice system to collapse if the prosecution is required to call all of those witnesses.5 7
Justice Scalia found that many jurisdictions were already complying with the dictates of
Crawford and that the sky was not falling now or going to fall because the Confrontation Clause
requires live testimony.5 8
III.

EXPERTS

Experts in the trial courts in America have a long history. As early as 1876, the United
States Supreme Court was making the distinction between, on one hand, subjects that were a
matter of common observation "upon which the lay or uneducated mind is capable of forming
a judgment" and, on the other hand, questions that require an expert because "in such
questions scientific men have superior knowledge."5 9 The key requirement for experts was that
their testimony would "assist the court or jury in reaching a correct conclusion."60
The focus for the fact-finder was always upon whether the facts underlying the opinion
were true and proven at trial. 6 1 One way an expert could perceive the facts underlying his
opinion was through personal observation. The party opposing the expert could cross-examine
the witness concerning the expert's own personal knowledge of facts.
The expert could be asked hypothetical questions, but jurors were instructed to carefully
look to the facts that supported the question and " [i]f the statements in these questions are not
supported by the proof, then the answers to the questions are entitled to no weight, because
[they are] based upon false assumptions or [false] statements of facts." 62 "[T]he opinions of
these experts depend very largely upon the truth of the hypothetical case that counsel on the
one side and on the other have seen proper to put to the witnesses during their
examination...."63 Jurors were forewarned to "...be careful to ascertain what the evidence
establishes as to the truth of the one or the other of these different hypothetical cases put by
counsel to the witnesses on the examinations." 64 The jury was left to decide whether the facts
assumed in a hypothetical question were both true and proven. 65
Even now, some jurisdictions specifically instruct the jury that part of their decision making
is determining the truth or falsity of the facts underlying an expert opinion. 66 The common law in
56

/d.

57 Id.
58

d.

s9 Milwaukee & Saint Paul Ry. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 472-73 (1876).
60 Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Lathrop, 111 U.S. 612, 618 (1884).
61 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 140 U.S. 76, 88 (1891).
62 Forsyth v. Doolittle, 120 U.S. 73, 77 (1887).
63 Union Ins. Co. v. Smith, 124 U.S. 405, 414 (1888).
64
Id. at 415.
65 Gottlieb v. Hartman, 3 Colo. 53, 63 (Colo. Terr. 1876) (citing Carpenter v. Blake, 75 N.Y. 12 (N.Y. 1878).
66
See, e.g., JUDICIALCOUNCILOF CALIFORNIA CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CACI) 220 (2003), ('In determining the
weight to give to the expert's opinion that is based on the assumed facts, you should consider whether the
assumed facts are true."); CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL (CALJIC) 2.82 (2005), in pertinent part,
(I)t is for you to decide from all the evidence whether or not the facts assumed in a hypothetical
question have been proved. If you should decide that any assumption in a question has not been
proved, you are to determine the effect of that failure of proof on the value and weight of the expert
opinion based on the assumed facts.
CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL: BOOK OF APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTIONS, BAJI 2.42 (2003), ("It is for you to decide

from all the evidence whether or not the facts assumed in a hypothetical question have been proved.");
ALABAMA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL, APJI 15.08, ( (f)irst examine carefully all the material facts stated in the
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the United States required the ability to test the expert opinion:
an expert's personal
observations would be subject to cross-examination, and if the expert was asked a hypothetical
question, those underlying facts were subject to being proven at trial through some other
method, usually witness testimony, and that testimony was subject to cross-examination.
Up to this point in the development of the utilization of experts at trial, jurors had the
ability to make credibility determinations based upon the cross-examination of a live witness:
either the expert himself or some other witness that testified to the underlying facts. Somewhere
along the development of expert testimony, the notion that the underlying facts had to be
proven as substantive evidence got lost.
Under the Federal Rules, expert analysis can be said to include eight considerations:
1. relevance 67
2. assist (fit) 68
3. qualified expert69

4. sufficient facts or data 70

5.
6.
7.
8.

reliable principles and methods 71
reliable application 72
appropriate basis for the opinion, introduced at the appropriate time 73
opinion on ultimate issue 74

The trial court should consider each of these steps in turn before admitting expert testimony.
Occasionally, trial courts have permitted an expert to discuss reliable principles and methods

hypothetical questions and be reasonably satisfied that they have substantially been proved to be true.");
and, for example, CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS - CRIMINAL (CALJIC) 2.8 (2010), in pertinent part,
An expert witness is permitted to consider statements made to the witness or a third person that have
not been made under oath in court. Statements considered by an expert witness which were made
to the witness or a third person do not prove that what was said was true. The truth of those
statements may come from other evidence. You should consider the failure to prove in court that it
was made or is true in determining what weight to give to the opinion of the expert.
NEW JERSEY MODEL CIVIL JURY CHARGES 1.13(A) (1995), ("You must determine if any fact assumed by the witness

has not been proved and the effect of that omission, if any, upon the weight of the expert's opinion.");

NEW

MEXICO UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL, (UJI) 14-5051 (2010),

You must find all the evidence whether or not the assumed facts have been proved. If you should
find that any assumption has not been proved, you are to determine the effect of that failure of proof
on the value and weight of the expert opinion based on the assumption.
PENNSYLVANIA SUGGESTED STANDARD CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, 4.10(B) (2001),
The value of an opinion given in response to a hypothetical question depends on various things,
including how close the assumptions made are to the true facts. One of your tasks, as jurors, is to
determine from all the evidence, whether or not the [facts] [testimony] assumed for a hypothetical
question [have been] [has been] proven to be true. If you find that any of the assumed [facts have]
[testimony has] not been proven, you should determine how that affects the value and weight of the
expert witness's opinion.
67 FED. R. EVID. 401, 401.
68

FED.

69

Id.

R.

EVID.

702.

70 Id.
71

Id.

72 Id.
73 FED.
74 FED.

R. EVID. 703, 705.
R. EVID. 704.
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without testifying to the application and/or express an opinion in the particular case.75 Expert
testimony, of course, is subject to Fed. Rule Evid. 403 considerations as well.7 6
The adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence codified the move from the underlying
facts having to be proven to a principle that as long as the facts were "reasonably relied upon
by experts in the field in forming opinions or inferences" the facts were admissible. Currently,
expert testimony in the Federal courts is governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rules 702
through 706. Rule 703 concerning the bases of an expert's opinion states, in pertinent part:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in
evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted.77
Many states adopted this precise language and continue to utilize it in their statute or rules of
evidence.78
Some courts have interpreted the second sentence of the Rule as not only permitting the
opinion to be based upon facts or data "reasonably relied upon by experts" in the field, but also
permitting the expert to testify to facts or data that are not admissible.79 A competing
interpretation is that while the expert could rely upon information that was otherwise
inadmissible, that evidence could not be revealed by the expert on direct examination.8 0 The
75 See, e.g., United States v. Smead, 317 Fed. Appx. 457, 464-65 (6th Cir. 2008) (excluding expert testimony in

part); United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 311-12, 314 (6th Cir. 2000) (reciting historical use of eyewitness
expert testimony and indicating that the expert testimony could be offered on the subject of psychological
factors which influence memory).
76 See, e.g., United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d. 321, 338 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that after the Rule 702 analysis
the court turns to a Rule 403 evaluation).
77 FED. R. EvID. 703.
78 ALASKA. R. EvID. 703; IoWA. R. EvID. 5.703; LA. CODE EVID. ART.703; ME. R. EvID. 703; MONT. CODE. ANN. 703; NEV. REV.
STAT., 50.285; N.H. R.EVID. 703; N.J. R. EvID. 703; N.C. GEN. STAT. G.S. §8C-1, RULE 702; OR. REV. STAT., §40.415, RULE
703; PA. R. EvID. 703; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS, § 19-15-3, RULE 703; TEX. R. EvID. 703; WASH. R. EvID. 703; W. VA. R. EvID. 703.
79

United States v. Pablo, No. 09-2091, 2010 WL 4609188 (10th Cir. Nov. 6, 2010)
(therefore, where an expert witness discloses otherwise inadmissible out-of-court testimonial
statements on which she based her opinion, the admission of those testimonial statements under Rule
703 typically will not implicate a defendant's confrontation rights because the statements are not
admitted for their substantive truth.

People v. Leach, No. 1-07-1448, 2010 WL 4629056 (III.App. Nov. 12, 2010) (holding that "while the contents of
reports and records relied upon by experts may be disclosed, an expert may also testify as to nontestifying
experts' findings and conclusions."); Foster v. State, No. 49AO4-0908-CR-435.930, 2010 WL 2983133 (Ind.App.
2010) (holding that the underlying basis may be disclosed under a three-part test: first, sufficient expertise;
second, 'the report is of the type normally found reliable," and third, the information is customarily relied
upon by experts in the field."); Gardner v. United States, 999 A.2d 55, 59-60 (D.C. 2010) (permitting the
hearsay underlying basis as long as a limiting instruction is given); Miller v. State, No. CR 08-1297 2010 WL
129708 (Ark. Jan. 7, 2010) (holding that the underlying basis for an expert opinion was hearsay, the
evidence was allowed to be presented on direct because it was 'critical in rendering a forensic
evaluation"); State v. Lui, 221 P.3d 948, 957-58 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that 'the trial court (has)
discretion to permit an expert to relate hearsay or otherwise inadmissible evidence to the jury for the limited
purpose of explaining the reasons for his or her opinion."); People v. Rutterschmidt, 98 Cal.Rptr.3d 390, 413
(Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (holding "an expert witness whose opinion is based on such inadmissible matter can,
when testifying, describe the material that forms the basis of the opinion."); People v. Leach, 908 N.E.2d
120, 131 (III. App. Ct. 2009) (holding that admissible facts, including another expert's findings and
conclusion for the limited purpose of explaining the basis for an expert opinion).
so United States v. Williams, No. 09-0026, 2010 WL 4071538 (D.C. Oct. 18, 2010) (holding that the a forensic
pathologist could use another pathologist's autopsy report as a basis for his opinion, that basis could not be
revealed on direct examination); Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 933 N.E.2d 93, 106 (Mass. 2010) (permitting
an expert to base his opinion on testimonial evidence from non-testifying witnesses, but prohibiting
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question arose whether Rule 703 then became another hearsay exception or an unwritten
method for circumventing hearsay. Some courts attempt to get around this interpretation by
holding that the evidence was admissible only as it went to the basis of the expert's opinion,
and, therefore, was not being admitted for its truth. But if the underlying facts and data are not
true, the expert's opinion would be irrelevant and subject to a Rule 403 exclusion.
In criminal cases, these questions implicate the Confrontation Clause.
Under the
common law of evidence, the Confrontation Clause was not an issue because the expert was
required to have personal knowledge that could be tested by cross-examination. Alternatively,
the expert could be asked a hypothetical question and the facts contained in the question
were subject to proof at trial. The expansion of the basis for the expert opinion to include other
evidence "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field" 81 opened the floodgates to
unconfronted evidence. 82
The Supreme Court sought to control the flood of unconfronted facts by the 2000
Amendment to Fed. Rule Evid. 403. The amendment added a sentence to the rule:
Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by
the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their
probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially
outweighs their prejudicial effect. 83
Several states adopted the new balancing test into their statutes or court rules of evidence. 84
The comments to the rule indicate the limited purpose of the "otherwise inadmissible"
facts or data. 85 The comment warns that the jury must be instructed that the basis for the
opinion is not admissible as substantive evidence (i.e., for its truth) but rather only as the basis of
the opinion. 86
Looked at from another angle, in order for the facts or data to support an opinion, the
facts or data must be true, or there must at least be a good-faith argument that the matters are
true. One problem arises when an expert testifies to the testing that another expert performed:
the basis is assumed to be true and there is no opportunity to cross-examine the original expert,
the "man behind the curtain."
Under the Rule, the expert may use any evidence that is "reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject." 87 Those facts
"need not be admissible," but if they are "otherwise inadmissible," the proponent is not
permitted to ask the expert on direct examination, and the expert is not permitted to disclose
them to the jury, unless a special balancing test is met.8 8 That balancing test is whether the

disclosure except on cross-examination); United States v. Gray, No. 3:09 CR 182, 2010 WL 3515599
(N.D.Ohio, Sept. 3, 2010) (experts may use the testimonial statements of non-testifying witnesses as the basis
of the opinion, but may not reveal them on direct examination); Martinez v. State, 311 S.W.3d 104 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2010) (holding that disclosure of information from non-testifying pathologist's autopsy report was
a violation of confrontation, but that the expert could use it as an undisclosed basis for his opinion).
81 FED. R. EvID. 703.
82 But see MICH. R. EvID. 703
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases and opinion or inference shall be
in evidence. This rule does not restrict the discretion of the court to receive expert opinion testimony
subject to the condition that the factual bases of the opinion be admitted in evidence thereafter.
83
84
85
86

87

FED. R. EvID. 703.
ARIz. R. EvID. 703; COLO. R. EvID. 703; N.D. R. EvID. 703; OKL.ST.ANN.
FED. R. EvID. 703 advisory committee notes (amended 2000).

§2703; UTAH. R. EvID. 703.

Id.

FED. R. EvID. 703

88 Id.
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"probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs their
prejudicial effect."89
Prior to the amendment, courts and commentators had reached different conclusions
on how to treat this information. "The amendment provides a presumption against disclosure to
the jury of information used as the basis for an expert's opinion and not admissible for any
substantive purpose, when the information is offered by the proponent of the expert." 90
The underlying basis for the opinion can be "otherwise inadmissible" for any number of
reasons. For example and pertinent here, although overlooked by the cases, the underlying
basis may not be admissible because its admission might violate the defendant's right to
confront the witnesses against him. The Wisconsin Supreme Court had this to say about
disclosure of the bases for expert opinions:
"(T)he thorny question of what to do with
inadmissible evidence that experts rely upon as a basis for an opinion is one that has proved
difficult to answer with a fair and workable rule." 91
Some courts indicate that the underlying basis is not being admitted for its truth, but
rather as the underlying basis of the opinion. 92 For example, the Tenth Circuit in United States v.
PablO 9 3 held that a defendant's right to confrontation usually would not be implicated where
the expert uses, as the basis of his own opinion, otherwise inadmissible out-of-court testimonial
statements. 94 The type and quantity of testimonial testimony permitted, however, is a question
of degree. 95 The expert cannot testify as a mere conduit of the non-testifying expert's
knowledge and opinion becuase the purpose for introducing the evidence is for its truth and,
therefore, a Confrontation Clause violation. 96 However, if the expert has formed his own opinion
based upon the non-testifying expert's report, introduction of the report is for the factfinder to be
able to test the underlying basis for the opinion, and, therefore, it does not violate the
Confrontation Clause.97
In Pablo, one expert was permitted to testify to statements contained in another expert's
DNA report and to a third expert's serology report.98 The defendant complained that his right to
confront the other experts had been violated by the introduction of the evidence of the two
non-testifying experts because the testifying witness was a mere conduit. The trial court, under
the Tenth Circuit's reasoning, was then required to determine whether the testifying expert was
merely a conduit for the other expert's reports or whether the expert had formed her own
opinion and, therefore, was only using the other expert's reports as the basis for her own
opinion. 99 The Tenth Circuit avoided resolving the underlying issue by finding there was no plain
error. 100 The Court also noted that Melendez-Diaz did not clearly resolve the issue.
The degree to which an expert may merely rely upon, and reference during her in-court
testimony, the out-of-court testimonial conclusions of another person not called as a

89 Id.

90 2000 Amendment Commentary, construed in FED. R. EvID 703.
91 Wisconsin v. Fischer, 322 N.W.2d 629, 637 (Wis. 2010).
92 Gardner v. United States, 999 A.2d 55, 59-60 (D.C. 2010); Marshall v. Oklahoma, 232 P.3d 467, 474-75
(Okla. Crim. App. 2010); New Mexico v. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d 1 (N.M. 2010); Washington v. Lui, 221 P.3d 948,
957 (Wash. App. 2009) (holding that "to the extent the experts here related testimonial hearsay statements
to the jury, they did so to explain the bases for their opinions."); Wood v. Texas, 299 S.W.3d 200, 213 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2009); California v. Nguyen, No. H026581, 2005 WL 2064165 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2005).
93 United States v. Pablo, No. 09-2091, 2010 WL 4609188 (10th Cir. Nov. 6, 2010).
94 Id. at 4.
95 Id. at 5.
96

Id.
97 Id.
98
Id.
99 Id.
ioo

id. at 7-8.
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witness is a nuanced legal issue without clearly established bright line parameters. Even
today with the benefit of Melendez-Diaz.101

This reasoning skips steps in evidentiary analysis and has the basic flaw that the expert,
the court, and the jurors assume that the underlying basis is true. If it is not true, then the
underlying bases would be inadmissible because they are not relevant. While there certainly
can be matters of fact that may be true or not true under a good faith analysis, the decision of
whether the facts are true is a chore for the factfinder and should not be left to the expert's
discretion. Often the testifying expert will not have sufficient personal knowledge of the facts
when he is testifying based on someone else's report and, therefore, not have a sufficient basis
for a valid exploration into the facts through cross-examination by the defense. Criminal
defendants claim it is those underlying facts that they have a right to confront.
IV.

POINT OF VIEW

Justice Scalia in Crawford adopted the following standard for testimonial statements:
statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial." 102 The only
authority for the citation was a National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and American
Civil Liberties Union amicus brief. 103 The brief itself sets out a standard only in two places, in the
introduction 104 and in the argument without any authority cited. 105 In fact, Justice Scalia
adopted only the first statement of the proposed rule, while the second recitation stated, "an
out-of-court statement is testimonial only when the circumstances indicate that a reasonable
declarant at the time would understand that the statement would later be available for use at a
criminal trial." While Justice Scalia adopted the standard, the standard's reference to an
"objective witness" has no firm roots in legal precedent. Notwithstanding its lack of an firm
foundation, Justice Scalia reiterated the standard in Melendez-Diaz. 106
This standard simply does not work. Any witness, lay or expert, after rational reflection,
would believe that any statement made to the government could be used in a later
prosecution. The pathologist who performs an autopsy at the request of law enforcement knows
that the report could be used in a later prosecution. The analyst who tests drugs would know
that the report could be used in a later prosecution. The clerk who prepares an affidavit of no
record after a diligent search knows that the affidavit could be used in a later prosecution. The
manufacturer who prepares blood alcohol test kits reasonably knows that the evidence could
be used in a later prosecution. To go to the extreme, manufacturers of blood alcohol testing
machines well know that those machines will be used for blood alcohol testing and that any
statements made by individuals in the manufacturing and testing of the machine could be used
in a later prosecution.
If the Confrontation Clause is going to be interpreted not to require live testimony from
every witness, a position the United States Supreme Court has long taken, 107 a more workable
line needs to be drawn than the point of view of an "objective witness." The Sixth amendment
guarantees that it is the "accused" who "shall enjoy the right" to be confronted with the
witnesses. 108 It is the defendant's right and the focus should not be taken from the defendant

ioi
102

Id. at 7.

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2010).
Brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers ("NACDL') and the American Civil Liberties
Union, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, (2003) (No. 02-9410), 2003 WL 21754961.
104 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.
05
i
/d. at 22.
106 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 U.S. 2527, 2527 (2009).
07
i
See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
108 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
103
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and placed upon some "objective witness." However, line drawing must take into consideration
not only the defendant's right to confrontation, but also the efficacy of cross-examination. The
defendant certainly may benefit from the cross-examination of the pathologist or the drug
analyst. The defendant can gain little, if any, benefit from the appearance and crossexamination of a clerk who found no record, or the manufacturer who prepared the blood
alcohol test kits, or the manufacturer of the blood alcohol testing machine.
Therefore, the point of view should be from a hypothetical reasonable defendant, not
the "objective witness." The question should not be whether the objective witness understands
that the statement could be used at a criminal trial, but rather whether a reasonable defendant
could benefit from cross-examination.
V.

Is SOMEONE - ANYONE - TO CROSS-EXAMINE SUFFICIENT?

There is a split of authority on whether it sufficient for someone - anyone - who is an
expert to be put on the witness stand so he can be cross-examined on the work and analysis
done by other experts. If there is any expert witness to examine, some courts have held that is
sufficient to admit the non-testifying expert's opinion or report as the underlying basis for the
expert opinion. 109 This rationale skirts both a hearsay analysis and a confrontation analysis.
After the decision in Melendez-Diaz, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in
Pendergrass v. Indiana, a case where one expert was called to testify to the procedures and
results produced by another expert. 10 Pendergrass was charged with inappropriately touching
his thirteen year old daughter based, in part, on DNA testing.111 The DNA analyst, Daun Powers,
was not called as a witness at trial. 1 12 Two exhibits were admitted that had been prepared by
Powers: an exhibit labeled "certificate of analysis" and an exhibit labeled "profiles for paternity
analysis." 113 The "certificate of analysis" enumerated the evidence submitted to the laboratory,
a list of tests performed, and a certification of where the test results were sent. 114 The "profiles"

109 See United States v. Turner, 591 F.3d 928, 932-33 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding no confrontation clause violation
for admitting expert's testimony based on underlying forensic testing of cocaine); United States v. Williams,
No. 09-0026 (PLF), 2010 WL 4071538, at*4-5 (D.D.C. Oct. 18, 2010) (denying admission of underlying report
serving as basis of expert's opinion); United States v. Mirabal, No. CR 09-3207 JB, 2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 91595 at
*11-13 (D.N.M. Aug. 7, 2010) (admitting expert testimony based on forensic chemical testing but not
allowing expert to testify to unavailable expert's conclusions); People v. Zayas, No. E048865, 2010 WL
3530426, at 1-2, 4 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2010) (admitting discussion of underlying forensic drug analysis at
trial); Commonwealth v. Avila, 912 N.E.2d 1014, 1029-30 (Mass. 2009) (holding expert could testify to
opinions based on autopsy report but not direct findings of the report); State v. Mitchell, 4 A.3d 478, 490
(Me. 2010) (holding no confrontation clause violation for admitting expert's testimony based on underlying
report); State v. Dilboy, 999 A. 2d. 1092, 1104 (N.H. 2010) (holding no confrontation clause violation for
admitting expert's testimony based on underlying report); State v. Bullcoming, 2010 NMSC 007, 226 P.3d 1,
8-9 (N.M. 2010) (admitting expert testimony based on underlying forensic testing for alcohol in blood), cert.
granted, Bullcoming v. New Mexico, No. 09-10876, 2010 WL 2008002 (U.S. Sept. 28, 2010); State v. Hough,
690 S.E.2d 285, 290-91 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010) (holding no confrontation clause violation by expert stating
opinion based on underlying reports); Wood v. State, 299 S.W.3d 200, 213 (Tex. App. 2009) (holding no
confrontation clause violation when expert gave opinion based on underlying autopsy reports, but a
confrontation clause violation did occur when autopsy report findings were disclosed). But See People v.
Dendel, No. 247391, 2010 WL 3385552 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2010) (holding a confrontation clause
violation by allowing expert opinion based on inadmissible underlying report).
110 Pendergrass v. Indiana, 913 N.E.2d 703 (Ind. 2009), cert. denied, Pendergrass v. Indiana, 130 S.Ct. 3409
(2010).
iii Pendergrass, 913 N.E.2d at 704.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
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document contained numbers in columns categorized by abbreviated test labels for each of
the three test subjects: Pendergrass, the daughter, and the fetus. 115
The State did call two witnesses concerning the DNA evidence. Lisa Black, a supervisor
at the laboratory, explained the process of test sampling. 116 She testified that she performed
technical, administrative, and random reviews of work performed by the DNA analysts. 117 She
did a "technical review" of Power's work in this case. 118 She relied on Power's notes to testify
about the procedures that were followed in this particular case. 119 Dr. Michael Conneally, a
DNA expert and the only other live expert witness to testify at trial, explained his conclusions and
how he applied the DNA principles. 120 This witness created a paternity index table to calculate
the probability of fatherhood of the fetus based upon the laboratory's test results. 121
The Indiana Supreme Court found no confrontation violation. 122 The Court found that
Black, the laboratory supervisor, "did have a direct part in the process by personally checking
Power's test results." 123 The fact that she looked at the results and could testify about standard
operating procedures were sufficient for the Court to find that there was no confrontation
violation. 124 "Here, the prosecution supplied a supervisor with direct involvement in the
laboratory's technical processes and the expert who concluded that those processes
demonstrate" the defendant was the father.125 The Court concluded that "this sufficed for Sixth
Amendment purposes." 126
The Court further found that although the exhibits might be inadmissible hearsay,
"opinions by qualified experts" "may rely on information supplied by other persons" "even if the
supplier is not present to testify in court." 12 7 The Court stated that the evidence relied upon by
the experts who did testify "might have been subject to a limiting instruction," but that it was not
error to admit them. 128
The Court seemed to be creating some type of exception for experts. However, any
such exception must take into account not only the Rules of Evidence as they relate to experts,
but also confrontation guaranteed by the Constitution. The dissent pointed out,
[the analyst who actually performed the test was] never subject to the rigors of crossexamination on either the examination she performed, the testing she conducted, or the
results she reached.... Although a supervisor might be able to testify to her charge's
general competence or honesty, this is no substitute for a jury's first-hand observations of
the analyst that performs a given procedure; and a supervisor's initials are no substitute for
an analyst's opportunity to carefully consider, under oath, the veracity of her results. 129
Since 2007, the courts in California since 2007 have been guided by the California
Supreme Court's decision in People v. Geier. 130 The California case in Geier was decided posti]is

/d.

ii16 Id.
1

i

7 Id.

18

id.

19

120

121
122
123
124
125
26

1

Id. at 705.

Id. at 704.
Id. at 705.
Id.
Id. at 707.
Id. at 707-08.
Id. at 708.
Id.

Id. at 708-09.
Id. at 709.
129 Id. at 710-11 (Rucker, J. dissenting).
130 California v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104 (Cal. 2007), cert. denied, Geier v. California, 129 S.Ct. 2856 (2009).
Interestingly, the denial of certiorari in Geier occurred on June 29, 2009, the Melendez-Diaz opinion issued
June 25, 2009. Before the Geier decision, the California appellate courts had held that autopsy reports
127
128
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Crawford, but pre-Melendez-Diaz.
Certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court
only four days after issuing Melendez-Diaz.
In Geier, the DNA analysis was performed by Paula Yates, a biologist. 131 However, the
prosecution chose to only call Dr. Robin Cotton, a DNA expert. 132 Dr. Cotton had "reviewed the
forms" Yates had filled out and Yates handwritten notes, as well as other data in the case. 133 The
defendant objected based upon his right to confront the person who actually did the analysis,
Yates. 134 After reviewing Crawford and the multitude of cases after Crawford, interpreting what
is testimonial, the California Court held that "we are nonetheless more persuaded by those
cases concluding that such evidence is not testimonial..." 13 5 The Court held that Crawford and
post-Crawford opinions required an analysis to determine whether a statement was testimonial
based on three conditions: (1) it is made to law enforcement, (2) it describes a past fact related
to criminal activity, and (3) it was made for possible use at a later trial. 136
The Court found that "the crucial point is whether the statement represents the
contemporaneous recordation of observable events." 137
Because Yates' information as
recorded in her report and notes were made as part of an objective and standardized scientific
protocol, they were not made to incriminate the defendant, but as part of Yates' employment
as an objective observer. 138 The analyst's records were properly received in evidence because
the testing took place in a "routine, non-adversarial process meant to ensure accurate
analysis." 139 The California Supreme Court thus held that there were two requirements in
overcoming a confrontation issue: first, there must be live testimony from some expert and an
opportunity to cross examine that expert, and second, the report must be a "contemporaneous
recordation of observable events." 140 The Court thus created a someone-anyone exception to
Confrontation.
The Geier analysis, even after Melendez-Diaz, has been utilized by the vast majority of
California cases in addressing such areas as DNA, 14 1 autopsies, 142 blood alcohol testing1 43 and
drug testing. 144 However, a minority of California Courts of Appeal have held that the Geier
analysis was overruled by the Melendez-Diaz case. 145
Both the Indiana Supreme Court in
were admissible either as business records, California v. Beeler, 891 P.2d 153, 167-70 (Cal. 1995), or as public
records, California v. Williams, 345 P.2d. 47,64 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
131 Geier, 161 P.3d at 132.
32
1 Id. at 131.
33
1 Id. at 132.
34
1 Id. at 133
35
1 Id. at 138
36
1 Id. at 138-39.
37
1 Id. at 140
138 Id. (quoting People v. Brown,801 N.Y.S.2d 709, 712 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005)).
139

Id.

California v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104, 140 (Cal. 2007).
People v. Suen, 2010 WL 4401796 (Cal.App. 2010) (DNA); People v. Reed, 2010 WL 4324384 (Cal.App.
2010) (DNA) People v. Blueford, 2010 WL 3932799 (Cal.App. 2010) (DNA)
142 See California v. Suen, No. B208155, 2010 WL 4401796, at *7-8 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2010) (DNA);
California v. Reed, No. B216570, 2010 WL 4324384, at *10-13 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov 3, 2010) (DNA); California v.
Blueford, No. B214908, 2010 WL 3932799, at *12-13 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2010) (DNA).
143 See California v. McKiernan, No. D055374, 2010 WL 3609173, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2010) (blood
alcohol testing).
144 See California v. Zayas, No. E048865, 2010 WL 3530426, at *1-5 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2010) (drug
testing); California v. Bingley, No. B205609, 2009 WL 3595261, at *4-6 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 3, 2009) (drug
testing, distinguishing Melendez-Diaz on ground that in Melendez-Diaz there was no live testimony at all and
therefore no opportunity to cross-examine and that the results of drug testing 'constitutes a
contemporaneous recordation of observable events').
45
1 See California v. Horn, No. SCD184821, 2010 WL 1138836, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2010) (DNA testing
where the witness was a 'reviewing criminalist,' not the person who had performed the analysis); California
v. Dungo, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 702, 710-12 (Cal. Ct. Ap. 2009) (pathologist relied exclusively on autopsy report
140
141
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Pendergrass and the California Supreme Court in Geier suggest, if not outright hold, that the
underlying basis of an expert opinion does not have to undergo the crucible of truth-testing that
is cross-examination. The Courts seem to have taken a wrong turn into at least an evidentiary
presumption that the underlying basis of the expert opinion does not have to be true to be
admissible.
Can the defendant's Confrontation Clause right be protected by an adequate crossexamination conducted of the experts in Pendergrass or Geier? Certainly the experts who testify
can testify on how certain procedures should be performed, but their testimony assumes the
truth of the reports underlying the factual basis. It would not be permissible for a lay person to
testify from the report of another lay person without doing the hearsay and confrontation
analysis. The "someone - anyone" analysis would never satisfy defendant's right to confront
when considering lay witnesses. Why then should it be permissible to have an expert witness
testify from the report of another technician, analyst, or expert?
The California Supreme Court granted certiorari in People v. Dungo to review the use of
the Geier holding. 146 The California Court of Appeals in Dungo held that the autopsy report in
that case was testimonial and that relying upon its contents violated the defendant's
confrontation rights. 147 The pathologist who performed the autopsy did not testify at trial. 148 The
prosecution called the employer of the pathologist, himself a pathologist, to testify. 149 The
employer-pathologist was not present at the autopsy and relied exclusively on his employee's
report and photographs of the autopsy to form his independent opinions regarding the cause of
death. 150 During his testimony, the expert was permitted to disclose parts of the autopsy report
from the other expert. 15 1 The trial court had held that there was no confrontation issue because
"experts can rely on hearsay to help form their opinions." 152 Further, the otherwise inadmissible
information was not being introduced "for the truth of the matter, that's just what he based his
opinion on." 15 3
The Court of Appeals first found that the autopsy report was testimonial. 154 In finding the
report testimonial, the Court considered the facts of the statutory purpose for the report
(circumstances, manner, and cause of death), the statutory duty to put the report in writing, the
requirement of immediate notification of law enforcement, and the fact that the report was
made during the course of a homicide investigation. 155 The Court found "the primary purpose...
of the report was to establish or prove some past fact...." 156
Concerning the use of the autopsy report at trial, the prosecution argued that the report
did not violate either hearsay rules or the Confrontation Clause because the information was not
introduced for its truth but rather as the basis of the opinion. 15 7 The Court found that the report
prepared by a different pathologist); California v. Lopez, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 825, 827 (Cal. Ct. Ap. 2009)
(criminalist supervisor testified about blood alcohol determined by an analyst).
146 California v. Dungo, 102 Cal.Rptr.3d 282 (Cal. 2009) (granting certiorari on the following issues: (1) "Was
defendant denied his right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment when one forensic pathologist
testified to the manner and cause of death in a murder case based upon an autopsy report prepared by
another pathologist?" (2) "How does the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 129 S.Ct. 2527 (2009) affect this court's decision in California v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104 (Cal.
2007).").
147 Dungo, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 710-11.
148 Id. at 706.
149
i

50

151
152

Id.

id.
Id. at 708.
Id. at 707.

153 Id.
54

Id. at 710.
/d. at 710-11.
156 Id. at 711.
5
i 7 Id. at 712.
1
i
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was "formally prepared in anticipation of a prosecution," in rejecting the prosecution's
arguments. 51 8 In its charge to the jury, the trial court had instructed in pertinent part that " [y]ou
must decide whether information on which the expert relied was true and accurate." 15 9 The jury
was thus required to determine whether the underlying autopsy report was true. "In other words,
the truth and accuracy of Dr. Lawrence's opinions was entirely dependent upon the accuracy
and substantive content of Dr. Bolduc's report."160
The Confrontation Clause, the Court
continued, is only satisfied when the defendant has an opportunity to cross-examine the person
who made the personal observations, not a different expert. 161 After finding a confrontation
violation, the Court also found that introduction of the evidence was not harmless. 162
VI.

JUSTICE THOMAS' VIEW OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

Justice Thomas authored a concurrence in Melendez-Diaz. 163 Although short, his opinion
is the controlling opinion because it was necessary to create the decision for the Court. "When
a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the
assent of five justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those
164
Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.'"
Justice Thomas continued to state his position that there is only a Confrontation Clause
violation if the out-of-court statements were "contained in formalized testimonial materials, such
as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions." 165 Because Melendez-Diaz involved
the admission of certificates stating the results of forensic analysis concerning the weight and
substance and because they were sworn to before a notary public, 166 Justice Thomas found
these certificates to "fall within the core class of testimonial statements" that violate the
Confrontation Clause. 167 Some courts have adopted this interpretation to permit documents,
such as autopsy reports, to be admitted into evidence because they are not "affidavits,
depositions, prior testimony, or confessions." 168
In White v. Illinois, Justice Thomas first stated his position that while hearsay and
confrontation were evolving common-law principles, each protected a different interest. 169 The

58

id.
Id. at 713.
60
i
Id.
161 Id. at 713-14.
62
I Id. 714-15
163 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2543 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring).
164 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)).
165 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2543 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing his concurring opinion in White v.
Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992).
166 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2531.
167 Id. at 2543 (Thomas, J., concurring).
168 See Larkin v. Yates, No. CV09-2034-DSF(CT), 2009 WL 2049991, at *7-8 (C.D. Cal. July 9, 2009) (holding
DNA report not testimonial); California v. Thompson, No. C061568, 2010 WL 4493478, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App.
Nov. 10, 2010) (holding pathologist's report a government record but not testimonial); California v. Zayas,
No. E048865, 2010 WL 3530426, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2010) (holding forensic drug analysis not
testimonial); California v. Hernandez, No. F057090, 2010 WL 3506888, at *16 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 8, 2010);
California v. Miller, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 629, 637 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug 20, 2010) (holding DNA report not
testimonial); Illinois v. Johnson, 915 N.E.2d 845, 853-54 (III. App. Ct. 2009) (holding DNA report not testimonial
); Maine v. Mitchell, 4 A.3d 478, 490 (Me. 2010) (autopsy report would not be testimonial under MelendezDiaz). But see California v. Lopez-Garcia, No. B215308, 2010 WL 3529775, at *10 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 13,
2010) (holding DNA report testimonial); Michigan v. Dendel, No. 247391, 2010 WL 3385552 (Mich. Ct. App.
2010) (holding forensic chemical analysis testimonial); State v. Lui, 221 P.3d 948, 955 n.11, 956 n.14 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2009) (holding autopsy and DNA reports testimonial, but were not used in lieu of live expert
testimony).
169 White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 358-60 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring).
i

159
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"right of confrontation evolved as a response to the problem of trial by affidavit." 170 But, Justice
Thomas went on to note, the Confrontation Clause was not intended to encompass hearsay in
general or in totality.171 Drawing the line at what documents were "made in contemplation of
legal proceedings and those not so made would entangle the courts in a multitude of
difficulties" and, ultimately, lead to a merger of the evidentiary hearsay doctrine and the
Confrontation Clause. 172 Justice Thomas found:
One possible formulation is as follows: The federal constitutional right of confrontation
extends to any witness who actually testifies at trial, but the Confrontation Clause is
implicated by extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are contained in formalized
testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions. It was
this discrete category of testimonial materials that was historically abused by prosecutors
as a means of depriving criminal defendants of the benefit of the adversary process
[citation omitted by author], and under this approach, the Confrontation Clause would
not be construed to extend beyond the historical evil to which it was directed. 173
Justice Thomas reiterated his position in his opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, in
Davis v. Washington. 174 The Justice criticized the Court's opinion by stating that the Court had
adopted an "unpredictable test, under which district courts are charged with divining the
'primary purpose' of police interrogations." 175 Reaffirming his prior position, Justice Thomas wrote
that a testimonial statement was "necessarily [one that] require[s] some degree of
solemnity...." 176 A primary purpose test, whether statements are made for purposes of later use
at trial or are made in response to an emergency, is rarely present in reality and is not reliably
discernable, making it inevitable that the search for such a purpose is largely "an exercise in
fiction." 177
VII.

BUSINESS AND PUBLIC RECORDS

Experts often rely upon various outside information and records in forming opinions.
Justice Scalia in Melendez-Diaz made the distinction between business record and public
records that are not made for use at trial and those that are created specifically for use in the
particular criminal trial. 178 As long as the records are made for the carrying on or the
administration of the business or public office, the records meet both the Confrontation Clause
and hearsay requirements.17 9 This analysis requires the person that prepared the document to
testify if the document was made specifically for use at trial. 180
To be true to the plain meaning of the Confrontation Clause, even those witnesses who
create a business record or a public record and those witnesses who provide the personal
knowledge that is contained in those records would have to testify. This notion has been
rejected. The Confrontation Clause has become a matter of line drawing. Since this is true,
there must be a rational basis for distinguishing between records made as part of the activities of
the business or agency and those records that are made specifically for litigation.

170
171
72
1
73

1

174

id. at 362 n.1.
Id.
Id. at 364.
Id. at 365.

Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 834 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).

I 7 5 Id.
76

1
i

77

Id. at 836.
Id. at 839.

Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2538 (2009).
Id. at 2539-40.
180 id. at 2540.
178
179
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Business records that meet the hearsay exclusion and are made as part of business
activities are not testimonial. 18 1 The custodian or other qualified witness (a witness who knows
how the records are made and kept) can testify in court to the foundation for the record. 18 2 The
custodian or other qualified witness is not required to have any personal knowledge about the
underlying facts that are contained in the record.
In fact, the records can be selfauthenticating if a certificate is made by the custodian or other qualified witness that establishes
the foundation for the business record. 183 The issue has not been addressed by the courts, but it
would seem under Justice Scalia's interpretation of the Confrontation Clause that a witness
would be required to come into court to testify to the foundation for the business record and
that introduction of a certificate meeting Fed. Rule Evid. 902(11) would be a violation. The crossexamination of the custodian or other qualified witness would prove of little assistance to the
defendant because the witness generally has no knowledge of the underlying facts. The
defendant cannot meaningfully cross-examine the custodian or other qualified witness
concerning the underlying facts whose truth, once the business record foundation has been
laid, is assumed. There is simply no rational distinction.
For the same reasons, a public record where a person comes to the trial court to testify
would be admissible if made as an activity of the agency, but the public record could not be
self-authenticating. This requirement simply is not workable nor does it further a criminal
defendant's confrontation rights.
For example, some circuit courts now hold that a public agency's "certificate of
nonexistence of record" (CNR) is insufficient and that the person who prepared the certificate
must appear in court. 184 The cross-examination of the person performing the records search
would prove of little assistance to the defendant. There is no meaningful cross-examination of
the witness who can only testify that a search was made for the record and it does not exist.
There is no rational distinction between the public employee who prepares a certificate of nonexistence and having the certificate admitted at trial and the same public employee appearing
in court for cross-examination.
Other public records have been permitted where cross-examination of a live witness
may have proven beneficial to the defendant. A warrant for removal and documents attesting
to the removal have both been found not to be testimonial because the documents were not
created for future prosecution. 185

See, e.g., United States v. Dadaille, 373 F. App'x. 380, 382-83 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding business record was
neither testimonial nor hearsay and, therefore, not excludable under the confrontation clause); United
States v. Jackson, 635 F.3d 875, 880-82 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding drug dealer's ledgers were testimonial;
however, reversed because ledgers were not properly authenticated and failed to meet hearsay
exception requirements under 803(6)); California v. Suen, No. B208155, 2010 WL 4401796, at *7-8 (Cal. Ct.
App. Nov. 8, 2010) (holding cell tower records are official business records and therefore non-testimonial);
Palacios v. State, No. 02-09-00332-CR, 2010 WL 4570072, at *5 (Tex. App. Nov 4, 2010) (holding hospital
records containing blood alcohol levels were medical records created for treatment purposes and thus
admissible).
182 FED. R. EvID. 803(6).
183 FED. R. EvID. 902(11).
184 See United States v. Scott, 2010 WL 4627876 (11th Cir. 2010) (summary of excerpts of business records
prepared for litigation); United States v. Gonzales, 2010 WL 4342192 (2nd Cir. 2010) (IRS certification that
defendant failed to file tax returns); United States v. Gipson, 2010 WL 2790646 (9th Cir. 2010) (declaration
stating that an FDIC search revealed no record); United States v. Norwood, 595 F.3d 1025, 1029-30 (9th Cir.
2010) (affidavit of absence of any record with Washington Department of Employment); United States v.
Martinez-Rios, 595 F.3d 581, 584-85 (5th Cir. 2010) (certificate of no record); United States v. Troxler, 2010 WL
3168147 (5th Cir. 2010) (certificate of non-existence of tax returns); United States v. Madarikan, 356 Fed.
App'x 532 (2nd Cir. 2009) (CDR).
185 United States v. Orozco-Acosta, 607 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Villaviencio-Burruel, 608 F.3d
556 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Diaz-Gutierrez, 354 Fed. App'x 774 (4 th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Cantellano, 430 F.3d 1142 (11 th Cir. 2005).
isi
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Some courts have made the distinction between whether the business records or public
records were made for this specific prosecution as opposed to records created in general. For
example, certificates of inspection of an intoxilyzer machine 186 and logbooks concerning a
breathalyzer 8 7 were found to be nontestimonial because the acts or facts recorded did not
pertain to this particular prosecution. Other courts, even after Melendez-Diaz, seem to indicate
otherwise, finding that the information is permissible because it is "neutral information." 188 In an
alien smuggling case, the introduction of the smuggled aliens 1-213 forms taken from their Afiles" did not violate Crawford-Melendez-Diaz because those records contained "only routine
biographical information" 189
VIII.

CONFRONTATION, RULE 402, AND THE RULE 703 BALANCING TEST

In 2000, Fed. Rule Evid. 703 was amended to include the following language:
Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the
proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their probative
value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs their
prejudicial effect. 190

The balancing test was added to the Rule because circuit courts differed on whether the
underlying basis was admissible and could be disclosed to the jury at all. 19 1 The Comment to the
amendment indicates that if the underlying basis is admitted a limiting instruction must be given.
The comment went further, stating:
The amendment provides a presumption against disclosure to the jury of
information used as the basis of an expert's opinion and not admissible for any
substantive purpose, when that information is offered by the proponent of the
expert. 192
As to how the States have dealt with the issue in their courts, certain states have adopted rules
similar to Rule 703 that resolve the issue by requiring that any underlying basis be proven to the
satisfaction of the factfinder at trial. 193 Other states have adopted the pre-amended Rule 703
without the balancing test 94 or the amended version of Rule 703.195
186 Jackson v. State, No. Al 0A2041, 2010 WL 4609148 (Ga. App. Nov. 16, 2010).
187 Illinois v. Jacobs, No. 4-09-0878, 2010 WL 4366876 (III. App. Nov. 1, 2010).

State v. Ducasse, No. Ken-10-159, 2010 WL 4456993 (Me. Nov. 9, 2010) (certificate of compliance by
manufacturer of blood collections kits used in testing blood alcohol levels); State v. Murphy, 991 A.2d 35
(Me. 2010) (certificate issued by Secretary of State concerning driving record and suspension and holding
that testimony would have little practical benefit on cross-examination); State v. Carter, 241 P.3d 1205 (Or.
App. 2010) (warrant based upon failure to appear, holding that the record was not created for purposes of
specific criminal prosecution).
189 United States v. Caraballo, 595 F.3d 1214, 1226 (11th Cir. 2010).
190 192 F.R.D. 340, 424 (2000).
191 Id. (Committee notes referring to two contrary circuit cases: United States v. Rollins, 862 F.2d 1282 (7 th Cir.
1988) (permitting evidence that was otherwise inadmissible); United States v. 0.59 Acres of Land, 109 F.3d
1493 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding error in the admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence)).
192 Id. at 425.
193 E.g., MICH. R. EvID. 703 ("The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion
188

or inference shall be in evidence").

ALASKA R. EvID. 703; I.C.A. R. 5.703; LA. CODE EVID. ART. 703; ME. R. EvID. 703; MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-10-703
(1976); NEV. REV. STAT. 50.285 (1971); N.H. R. EVID. 703; N.J. R. EvID. 703; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8C-703 (WEST 1983);
OR. REV. STAT. § 40.415 (1981); PENN. R. EvID. 703; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-15-3 (2010); TEx. R. EvID. 703; WASH. R. EVID.
703; W. VA. R. EvID. 703.
195 ARIz. R. EvID. 703; COLO. R. EvID. 703; N.D.R. EvID. 703; OKLA. STAT. TIT. 12, CH. 40, § 2703 (1978); UTAH R. EvID. 703.
194
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The Amendment gives rise to the following issues: (1) whether the balancing test is
sufficient to protect a defendant's confrontation rights; (2) whether a limiting instruction is
sufficient to protect a defendant's confrontation rights; and (3) whether the presumption against
admission is sufficient to protect a defendant's confrontation rights.
A.

CONFRONTATION AS A RULE

402 ISSUE

Perhaps the wisest course in determining these issues requires us to return to the threshold
relevance inquiry in the evidentiary analysis. Fed. Rule Evid. 402 states that relevant evidence is
admissible "except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of
Congress, by these rules. . . ." The language of the rule suggests that once a relevance
determination has been made one question to ask is whether the Constitution permits the use of
such evidence. So that even if relevant, evidence may be excluded if it violates the
Confrontation Clause. If this is true, the issue of the admissibility of the underlying basis of an
expert's opinion must first go through confrontation testing. Under this analysis, Confrontation
Clause issues are considered before the Rules of Evidence. Further, the balancing test would
only apply to evidence that has been found to be admissible under the Confrontation Clause
and inadmissible under the rules of evidence. If the analysis begins at 402 instead of 703, all
three issues are avoided because it is not the Rule of Evidence or the balancing test, but the
Constitution itself that protects the defendant's confrontation rights.
B.

CONFRONTATION AS A RULE

703 ISSUE

However, when it comes to the basis of an expert's opinion, courts tend to conduct their
analysis under Rule 703. First, the Confrontation clause issue could be considered in determining
whether the evidence is "otherwise inadmissible." Second, under the balancing test, any
Confrontation Clause issue could be considered in the "prejudicial effect" portion of the
analysis. The appropriate analysis under Rule 703 would be:
Step 1. Is the evidence admissible? This would require subjecting the fact or data to
an analysis through the Rules of Evidence and the Confrontation Clause. If the evidence is
admissible and has been or will be admitted into evidence at trial, there would be no
Confrontation issue. However, if the evidence is "otherwise inadmissible," the trial court would
then go to Step 2.
Step 2. If the evidence is inadmissible under the Rules of Evidence, can the evidence
be admitted to test the basis for the expert's opinion or inference? This would require
considerations of the presumption against admissibility, the Confrontation Clause, and the
satisfaction of the balancing test.
The problem with Rule 703 and permitting testimony concerning the underlying basis of
the expert's opinion is that the Rule then becomes an end run around the Rules of Evidence. It
becomes a de facto hearsay exception. If the witness expert testifies that the facts are those
that are reasonably relied upon by experts in the field, the factfinder will, just as the expert does,
assume that those underlying facts are true. The "reasonably relied upon" phrase becomes
magic language used by the proponent of the underlying basis of an expert opinion to avoid
Confrontation and the Rules of Evidence.
The jurors' proper function as trier of fact is taken away when the expert assumes facts as
true for purposes of his opinion or inference. There is no ability for the jurors to test the underlying
facts. The facts are admitted because the facts are of a type that are reasonably relied upon
by experts in the field in forming an opinion or inference. This makes the expert the determiner of
what is true. The only possible line of cross-examination is to point out that the opinion relies upon
the basis being true. The expert opinion falls if the expert admits that a sufficient number of the
facts are false, but that depends upon the expert determining whether the underlying basis is
true or false. The cross-examiner is required to ask either a general question, which in itself is not
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very effective, or to ask specific questions concerning each underlying fact, which then
reinforces the fact as being true, whether true or is isnot.
C.

LIMITATION ON LIMITING INSTRUCTIONS

The efficacy of limiting instructions has long been questioned. 196 "Empirical evidence as
well as common sense suggests that courts greatly exaggerate the efficacy of limiting
instructions." 197 Limiting instructions are not talismans for the solution of any possible prejudice. 198
The possibility that the jury will consider evidence only to its limited purpose is occasionally
overcome by the negative aspects as to be unmanageable from the jurors perspective. 199
The argument can be made that a limiting instruction is sufficient if it advises the
"otherwise inadmissible" evidence can only be considered as it goes to the foundation for the
expert's opinion or inference and cannot be used for the truth of the underlying facts. If the
jurors can actually perform these mental gymnastics, the defendant's confrontation rights are
said to be protected. The question arises whether a reasonable juror can actually separate out
these two separate uses. Whether the use of a limiting instruction when it comes to separating
out the proper and improper use of the evidence can conceivably eliminate the risk of misuse is
an open matter. 200 Limiting instructions are a nicety and are perhaps a necessary method of
attempting to prevent jurors from improperly considering this evidence. Empirical research has
found that limiting instructions are generally unsuccessful at controlling how the jurors' perceive
and utilize evidence. 201
Limiting instructions are not up to the task that the Rules of Evidence require. It is difficult
if not impossible for jurors to determine what is admissible because it is "reasonably relied upon
by experts in the field in forming their opinions" to be used only for testing the basis of the
expert's opinion and to differentiate that from the assumption that those facts are true.
D.

PRESUMPTION AGAINST ADMISSIBILITY

The Advisory Committee Notes to the Rule 703 balancing test state that there is a
presumption against admissibility of the "otherwise inadmissible" basis for an expert's opinion. 202
Otherwise inadmissible evidence "shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the
opinion or inference unless the court determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to
evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect." 203 This places on
the proponent of the testimony the burden of going forward with evidence sufficient to prove
certain propositions by a preponderance of evidence. First, the trial court is required to
determine the weightiness of that the evidence will have with the jurors only to the extent that it
will help the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion. Second, the court is required to determine the
weightiness of any prejudicial effect. Finally, the court is then to balance those two items to
determine whether the probative value previously determined "substantially" outweighs the
prejudicial effect.
This balancing test will have to be applied by the trial court either before trial or as each
piece of "otherwise inadmissible" evidence is introduced at trial. If not determined pretrial,
Lieberman and Arndt, Understanding the Limits of Limiting Instructions, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 677
(2000).
197 Richard A. Posner, Frontiers of Legal Theory 384 (2001).
198 United States v. Schiff, 612 F.2d 73, 82 (2nd Cir. 1979).
196

199 Id.

See, e.g., Illinois v. Clay, 884 N.E.2d 214 (III. App. 2008) (concerning the introduction of a prior conviction
and the limiting instruction that the conviction could only be used for credibility).
201 Lieberman & Arndt, supra note 195.
202 192 F.R.D. 340, 424-25 (2000).
200

203 Id.
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each piece of facts or data of "otherwise inadmissible" evidence will require an objection or
motion to strike, a bench conference, a ruling, and a limiting instruction that advises the jury
either to disregard the evidence or to considered the evidence only as it goes to an evaluation
of the expert's opinion and not as substantive evidence.
IX.

BASES OF EXPERT OPINION AND JURY INSTRUCTIONS

Perhaps if the trial court judge does five things, violation of the Confrontation Clause
might be minimized, but it cannot be completely eliminated. First, the trial judge must carefully
scrutinize the underlying basis to determine whether or not the facts and data are admissible.
Second, the trial judge must make sure that the basis meets the Rule 703 requirements when he
has found that the basis consists of some facts or data that are "otherwise inadmissible" to
determine whether those facts are "reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject." Third, the trial judge must run the basis through
the gauntlet of the special balancing test. Fourth, the judge must give a limiting instruction
before and after the evidence is offered. Fifth and finally, the trial judge must properly instruct
the jury.
The final instruction to the jury must remind them that the jurors, and not the expert, must
make the determination whether the underlying basis is true or not. The jurors cannot, as seems
natural, assume the truth of the underlying facts and data, but must themselves find the facts to
be true or not. It would not be hard to inform the jurors that the jurors, and not the expert, are
the final arbiters of the truth.
Most current pattern jury instructions are not up to the job. The Federal Pattern Jury
Instructions appear to surrender the truth-finding function of the underlying basis to the expert.
The Federal Pattern Criminal Jury Instruction as pertinent to this issue only provides "[y]ou must
also decide whether his opinions were based on sound reasons, judgment, and information." 2 0 4
This pattern instruction requires the juror to dissect the sentence to discover that the expert
opinion was based on "sound . . . information." The First Circuit has a pattern jury instruction
concerning weighing the testimony of an expert that states, in pertinent part:
In weighing the testimony, you should consider the factors that generally bear upon
credibility of a witness as well as the expert witness's education and experience, the
205
soundness of the reasons given for the opinion, and all other evidence in this case.

Somewhere in that instruction, the jurors' are required to discern that they are required to be
fact finders concerning the underlying basis of the expert's opinion. The Fifth, Seventh, Ninth and
Tenth Circuits have similar instructions. 206
The Eighth Circuit has an instruction that informs the jurors that they do not have to
accept an expert opinion and that they should "consider the witness's education and
experience, the soundness of the reasons given for the opinion, the acceptability of the
methods used, and all the other evidence in the case." 207 Somehow that instruction is suppose
to inform the jurors that the underlying facts and data are subject to truth finding by the jurors
themselves. The Third Circuit does better by informing the jurors, "in weighing this opinion
testimony you may consider... the reliability of the information supporting the witness'
opinions...."208

204 PATTERN CRIM. JURY INSTR. 35 (1987).
205 PATTERN CRIM. JURY INSTR. 1STCIR. 2.06 (1998).
206 PATTERN CRIM. JURY INSTR. 5TH CIR. 1.17 (2001); FED. CRIM. JURY INSTR. 7TH CIR.

3.07

(1999); MODEL CRIM. JURY INSTR. 9TH

CIR. 4.14 (2010); PATTERN CRIM. JURY INSTR. 10TH CIR. 1.17 (2011).
207 MODEL CRIM. JURY INSTR. 8TH CIR. 4.10 (2007).
208 MOD. CRIM. JURY INSTR. 3RD CIR. 2.09.
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Some State courts do a much better job in letting the jurors know their specific truthfinding function. California informs the jurors, in pertinent part:
An opinion is only as good as the facts and reasons on which it is based. If you find that
any fact has not been proved, or has been disproved, you must consider that in
determining the value of the opinion. 209
Massachusetts has an alternate instruction concerning expert opinions that provides, in
pertinent part:
It is also entirely up to you to decide whether you accept the facts relied on by the expert
and to decide what conclusions, if any, you draw from the expert's testimony.... You must
also, as has been explained, keep firmly in mind that you alone decide what the facts are.
If you conclude that an expert's opinion is not based on the facts, as you find them to be,
then you may reject the testimony and opinion of the expert in whole or in part . . .. You
must remember that expert witnesses do not decide cases: juries do ... . 2 1 0
New Jersey carefully instructs jurors that it is the function of the jury, not the expert, "to
determine whether the facts on which the answer or testimony of an expert is based actually
exists." 2 11
Despite these samples, courts do a very poor job in instructing the jurors about their truthfinding function overall. The only appropriate way to be sure that a criminal defendant's
confrontation rights are observed is to permit cross-examination of a testifying witness and
advise the jurors of their truth-seeking role concerning the underlying facts and data for an
expert opinion.
X.

NOTICE AND DEMAND STATUTES

Notice-and-demand statutes require that the prosecution must first provide notice that
an expert will testify at trial. The defendant after receiving the prosecution's notice must either
assert his confrontation right to have the witness testify at trial or forfeit that right. 212 Citing Taylor
v. IllinoiS213 and Williams v. Florida, 214 the Court held in Melendez-Diaz that the defendant can be
required to assert his confrontation rights before trial. 2 15
Justice Scalia thought that defense attorneys would often stipulate to certain expert
testimony. 216 He surmised that it would be unlikely that the defense would insist on the
appearance and testimony from witnesses that the defense does not intend to challenge. 217 In
a rational and reasonable world this may be true. However, a criminal defendant can
constitutionally insist at trial on proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to each and every element,
and a criminal defendant is not required to forego his Confrontation Clause rights for any
reason. In fact in some jurisdictions that have notice-and-demand statutes, defense attorneys
as a matter of course file demands for live testimony from every expert.
The fact that the defendant can be required pre-trial to demand live testimony from an
expert does not entirely resolve the issue concerning the underlying basis for the expert's opinion
209 CAL. JURY INSTR.-CRIM. 2.80 (2010).
210 CRIM. MODEL JURY INSTR. 3.640 (2009).
211

N.J. MODEL

CRIM. JURY INSTR. EXPERT TESTIMONY

(2003).

Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2541 (2009).
213 Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988) (upholding sanctions for defendant's failure to provide witness names
and location pre-trial).
214 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (upholding a requirement for pre-trial alibi notice).
2 15
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2541.
2 16
212

Id. at 2542.

217 Id.
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or inference. Still left to be resolved are those pesky "otherwise inadmissible" facts underlying
the expert's testimony. To solve this problem, the notice-and-demand requirement could be
expanded to include a defendant's notice that the prosecution will be required to prove each
and every underlying fact at trial, either through personal knowledge of the expert or through
some other witness or method of proof.
XI.

SEARCHING FOR A SOLUTION

An acute problem arises when the expert becomes unavailable by reason of loss,
change of employment, severe illness or infirmity, death, or another unforeseen circumstance.
To exclude another expert's reliance upon an expert who has become unavailable in one of
these situations would give the defendant an unfair advantage. As the Mattox Court indicated
in 1895 in reference to the Confrontation Clause:
There is doubtless reason for saying that the accused should never lose the benefit of any
of these safeguards even by the death of the witness . . . . But general rules of this kind
however beneficent in their operation and valuable to the accused, must occasionally
give way to consideration of public policy and the necessities of the case .... The law, in
its wisdom, declares that the rights of the public shall not be wholly sacrificed in order that
218
an incidental benefit may be preserved for the accused.

A defendant's right to cross-examine and the efficacy of any cross-examination should be
considered in determining what "otherwise inadmissible" evidence should be permitted as the
basis for an expert's opinion.
An actual example of the problem is presented in United States v. Williams, a Federal
District Court case.219 Williams was charged with murder, and one expert conducted the
autopsy. 220 However, this expert retired and moved overseas. 221 The prosecution filed a motion
in limine to permit the introduction of the autopsy report and death certificate from the
unavailable expert, the introduction of a diagram and photographs taken during the autopsy;
and the testimony of another medical examiner who was not present at the autopsy but who
examined the materials and formed his own opinion about the cause and manner of death. 222
Certainly it would be an unjust result if the prosecution was not able to use at least some of this
evidence at trial.
The first possible solution is to adopt a rule in criminal cases that requires that the factual
underlying basis of the expert's opinion be proven. The right to confront would be fulfilled by the
introduction of direct evidence from the testifying expert or from other individuals, expert or not,
that could testify to underlying facts. All witnesses would be subject to cross-examination. This
would be truest to the literal constitutional language. This is the classic and perhaps easiest
solution to the problem. But it also would require more testimony by more witnesses where
expert testimony is involved. In our example, because of the unavailability of the expert who
performed the autopsy, the autopsy report would be inadmissible. Whether the diagram and
the photographs are admissible is a question of establishing the appropriate foundation through
the Rules of Evidence and is not a confrontation issue. Without the pathologist who did the
autopsy, created the diagram, and took the photographs, a satisfactory evidentiary foundation
could not be met. The cause and manner of death could not be proven with this solution. The
cost of this first solution is simply too high.

2 18

221

Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895).
United States v. Williams, 2010 WL 4071538 (D.D.C. Oct. 18, 2010).
Id. at *1.
Id.
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Id.
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If the first solution is rejected, it becomes a matter of line-drawing. Justice Thomas has
suggested one place to draw that line: in order to be testimonial and require confrontation, the
testimonial statement would have to be "contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as
affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions." 2 23 The question, of course, is what the
language means and how those enumerated items would be construed by the courts. This
solution would require the development of case law over a period of time. It would be easy to
state that the autopsy report was not "formalized materials," not an affidavit, not a deposition,
not prior testimony, and certainly not a confession. However, whether the autopsy report would
be considered "formalized testimonial materials" is problematic. Justice Thomas formula would
have to be tested and refined in the trial courts.
The third solution is to draw the line on a hypothetical view of an "objective person" as
Justice Scalia suggests. 224 That objective witness would need to find that it was reasonable to
believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial. 22 5 But, a reasonable
witness would never truly believe, after a little rational reflection, that when he has witnessed
something that relates to a criminal offense and makes a statement about it, that any statement
the witness makes would not be used at trial. So the question arises, what statements could be
permitted under Justice Scalia's standard? Justice Scalia's point of view is wrong: it is not the
reasonably objective witness's point of view, but rather whether a reasonable defendant could
benefit from the cross-examination of the witness.
Under Justice Scalia's analysis, in order to satisfy the Confrontation Clause, a witness must
either testify in court or, if unavailable, the defendant had a prior opportunity for crossexamination. 226 In our example, the hypothetical "objective witness," or the reasonable
pathologist, would know that one of the functions of an autopsy report is for use at a later trial.
Because the witness knows this, the autopsy report could not be admitted at trial, except, under
current practice, as perhaps part of the underlying bases of an opinion or inference by a
testifying expert and even then, it could not be used for substantive purposes.
As a fourth solution, "testimonial" can be refined to exclude certain items but permit
others. First, "testimonial" evidence should exclude items that were not prepared for a specific
prosecution. For example the types of information that might be excluded include certificates
or logbooks of inspection of an intoxylizer227 or certificate of compliance by a manufacturer that
blood collection tubes complied with state requirements. 228
Second, "testimonial" should exclude business records or public records that contain
"neutral information" irrespective of whether the record was made in pursuance of the business
or agency's activities or whether it was prepared for a particular prosecution. While it appears
Justice Scalia would permit the introduction of certain business and public records prepared for
the furtherance of the business or agency and not made for this particular litigation, 229 this
category would be expanded to include certain records that were specifically created for use
in this particular prosecution. For example, courts have permitted the introduction of certificates
from the Secretary of State concerning motor vehicle licenses, records, and suspensions, without
requiring someone from that office to appear and testify in court. 230 Another example would be
evidence of court judgments concerning convictions. A certified copy of the judgment that is
specifically requested by the prosecution and created by a court clerk's office should not be
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2543 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting White v.
Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992)).
224 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2532.
2 25
Id. at 2531.
223

226 Id.
227 Jacobson

v. State, 2010 WL 4609148 (Ga. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2010); Illinois v. Jacobs, 2010 WL 4366876 (III.
App. Ct. Nov. 1, 2010).
228 State v. Ducasse, 8 A.3d 1252 (Me. 2010).
229 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2538.
230 State v. Murphy, 991 A.2d 35 (Me. 2010).
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excluded because a live witness did not testify - although that appears to be the result of the
holding in Melendez-Diaz. However, if the point of view of a reasonable defendant is adopted
and the benefit the defendant might receive through cross-examination is weighed, these
documents, although prepared for this particular prosecution, would be admissible.
Third, "testimonial" should exclude, during an expert's testimony on direct examination,
any evidence that is otherwise inadmissible. However, such evidence should be permitted
during cross examination and, to the extent raised on cross-examination, during redirect
examinations. The defendant, who is under no confrontation requirement, can thus open the
door to the prosecution's use of this otherwise inadmissible evidence. 23 1 This would jettison the
current Fed. Rule Evid. 703 balancing test and its State's corollaries from use in a criminal case.
The matter would be one of the jurors assessing the truth of facts underlying the expert's opinion
or inference. As discussed above, Rule 703 has been used to justify the admission of evidence
that the jury should not receive because it is inadmissible under the Rules of Evidence and
inadmissible as a violation of the Confrontation Clause.
If, however, the admission of the "otherwise inadmissible" basis for expert opinion's
continues, the trial court must ensure to the fullest extent possible that a defendant's
Confrontation Clause rights are observed. This is best performed by utilizing an exacting
evidentiary analysis that requires: (1) the trial court determines whether the facts underlying the
opinion are admissible or inadmissible; (2) the trial court determines whether the inadmissible
facts or data are reasonably relied upon by experts in the field in forming their opinions; (3) the
trial court applies the special balancing test in Rule 703; (4) the judge gives a limiting instruction
before and after the evidence; and (5) the jury is properly instructed as to its role in determining
the truth of the underlying facts or data.
The application of the fourth solution would not permit the admission of the autopsy
report except on cross-examination and re-direct examination to the extent cross opened the
door for such evidence. More specifically, the autopsy report could not be disclosed unless the
defendant was the first proponent of the evidence.
The District Court Judge in the Williams case came up with the following findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and orders. First, the Judge found that the autopsy report and death
certificate were testimonial. 232 Because the documents were testimonial, the Judge excluded
them from being admitted at trial. 23 3 Further the Judge stated that the prosecution could not
make an end run around Melendez-Diaz by having another expert testify to the contents of the
autopsy report. 234 Referencing Fed. Rule Evid. 703, the Court held that the second expert could
testify to his own independent opinion concerning the cause or manner of death, even if this
expert relied on the excluded autopsy report. 235 However, the underlying facts or data that
were otherwise inadmissible were not admissible on direct examination. 236
XII.

CONCLUSION

Courts have permitted "otherwise inadmissible" evidence underlying an expert's opinion
to be presented to the jury both through the Ohio v. RobertS 23 7 "indicia of reliability" and the
Crawford v. Washington 238 "opportunity to cross-examine" analyses. Courts have made the
analyses go both too far and not far enough in protecting a criminal defendant's Confrontation
See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d 716, 733 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding that "a defendant
can open the door to admission of evidence otherwise barred by the Confrontation Clause.').
232 United States v. Williams, 2010 WL 4071538, at *2 (D.D.C. Oct. 18, 2010).
233 Id. at *4.
231
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235 Id.
236
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238

Id. at *5.
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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Clause rights. Rule 703 surreptitiously allows jurors to assume inadmissible facts as true. Courts
avoid a Confrontation Clause analysis by using the legal fiction that the evidence is not being
admitted for its truth, but rather as a tool for the jurors to examine the expert's opinion or
inference. Because the Supreme Court has never gone sufficiently far enough to explain the
parameters of the Confrontation Clause, trial and circuit courts are struggling with how that
Clause and expert testimony under the Rules of Evidence fit together. Compounding the
problem is the expansion of fields of expertise and the utilization of expert testimony at trial.
The change in the point of view from an objective witness to a reasonable defendant's
point of view and the measuring of the possible benefit of cross-examination concerning the
particular evidence would improve Confrontation Clause analysis as it relates to experts. Under
this analysis, a certificate of no report or a certified court record would be admissible because
there is little benefit from cross-examining an analyst who searched or certified the records.
Melendez-Diaz requires the exclusion of those records and requires the appearance of a witness.
Under this analysis, certificates of analysts would not be admissible because there is benefit from
cross-examining an analyst to determine whether the results of any testing, whether for drugs,
alcohol, or DNA, were both reliable and verifiable. Melendez-Diaz requires the same result.
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